the futures price depends on whether the aggregate hedging position by producers is long or short. 4 The hedging pressure literature usually assumes, first, that only a single risky security is traded, and second, that the only sources of risk in the economy are random supply/demand shocks for the futures-traded commodity. In contrast, the branch of the futures literature based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) allows for many risky tradable endowments. However, by assuming that equity claims to producers' future revenues are tradable,5 the traditional CAPM rules out the incentive for producers to hedge using futures; they instead trade to well-diversified portfolios along the efficient frontier.6
Both the hedging pressure and traditional CAPM models are "partial equilibrium," in the sense that they do not model the consumption choice between the futures-traded and other commodities. Instead, decisionmakers maximize expected utility derived from generalized wealth, which is equivalent to assuming only a single consumption good. The primary purpose of the current paper is to reexamine the effect of hedging on the futures risk premium within a general equilibrium (multi-good) setting.7 The paper differs from the standard hedging pressure and CAPM literatures in that (i) demand for the futures-traded commodity is determined as an optimizing consumption choice among different goods, and (ii) in selecting futures positions, individuals take into account that the relative prices of the goods they consume are changing. Allowing for more than a single consumption good makes it possible to examine how the consumption preferences such as complementarity affect equilibrium risk premia.
To investigate how hedging by producers influences risk premia, the case of zero complementarity (additive separability) is examined with both costless and costly futures trading. When trading is costless, the main pricing prediction of the hedging pressure theory is refuted. As consumer preferences vary, the spot market demand elasticity changes, causing aggregate hedging to change from short to long. Nevertheless, the futures price remains unbiased,8 so hedgers are 4A recent study by Chang (1985) lends support to this thesis, in that futures prices for grains on average rise when hedgers are short, and fall when hedgers are long.
5That is, the CAPM in effect assumes that all producers costlessly issue equity shares in their businesses.
6The models of Stoll (1979) and D. Hirshleifer (1988a) combined producer hedging with a stock market. In such a setting, the futures price bias has additive components, the first due to the futures contract's "beta" (covariance of its return with the return on the stock market portfolio of all tradable endowments), and a second due to hedging by producer's of their revenue risks from sales of the commodity. Breeden's (1980 Breeden's ( , 1984 general equilibrium consumption-based CAPM also allows for nontraded endowments, and therefore implicitly for producer hedging.
7A general equilibrium literature has examined a different set of issues. J. Hirshleifer (1977), Grauer and Litzenberger (1979), Richard and Sundaresan (1981) , and Breeden (1980 Breeden ( , 1984 examine futures pricing in multi-good settings, but not the role of producer hedging in futures pricing. Stiglitz (1983) and Britto (1985) provide a number of useful results concerning hedging by producers; the current paper differs from these in that all rather than a subset of traders are concerned with two consumption goods, and in its focus on nontrading by some investors. 8 The conditions discussed below leading to unbiased futures pricing are not new. However, it does not seem to have been recognized that this general equilibrium prediction conflicts with the hedging pressure prediction of recent partial-equilibrium models with risk-averse speculators. able to reduce their risk without paying a premium to speculators. Furthermore, under more general preferences there is still no presumption that producer hedging will promote futures price bias.
The source of the disagreement between the different classes of models is a neglected element in the partial-equilibrium account, the risks borne by consumers of the commodity. Here, since consumers' risks prove to be inverse to those of producers, the hedging pressures of the two groups are in opposite directions. Therefore, the two groups reduce their own type of risk by mutually hedging on the futures market, with neither receiving a premium from the other.
However, the partial-equilibrium models are certainly realistic in limiting the participation of consumers in the futures market. Owing to fixed setup costs (such as finding a broker or learning about the market), few commodity consumers trade futures9 to hedge relative price changes, despite the consumptionhedging incentives described by Breeden (1984) . Randomness in the price of a single commodity such as corn is relatively inconsequential to a consumer of many commodities, but imposes a substantial risk on a specialized producer. Setup costs will therefore differentially tend to deter small consumers rather than producers of the commodity from participating in the futures market.
I show here that nonparticipation by consumers restores the effect of hedging pressure on price bias. Consider the " traditional" case in which producers hedge short (price risk outweighs quantity risk). Since the consumers who remove themselves from the futures market would have hedged long, nonparticipation creates an imbalance between the hedging pressure of producers and of the remaining consumers. Balance is restored by a downward price bias, which discourages short hedging while encouraging the remaining consumers to enlarge their long positions. The analysis therefore shows that hedging-induced futures price bias derives fundamentally from barriers to futures trading that impact differently upon consumers rather than producers.10
The paper is structured as follows. The economic setting is described in Section 1. Section 2 analyzes futures price bias and dynamic hedging strategies in markets without transaction costs. Section 3 shows how fixed setup costs of trading in the futures market affect the price bias. Section 4 concludes the paper.
THE ECONOMIC SETTING
Each individual is endowed with a stochastically variable quantity of a risky commodity Z and a known quantity of the numeraire commodity N ("all other 9Stock mutual funds do not trade in commodity futures, so investors who wish to include commodities in their portfolios must resort to specialized futures funds. Pension funds face regulatory constraints on trading commodity futures. Alternatively, shifting risk from growers to consumers by off-exchange forward contracting would clearly be very costly, if it operates through the intermedia, tion of millers, bakers, and retailers at different stages in the production process.
1?This explains Gray's (1960) finding that bias tends to be more pronounced in thin (low participation) futures markets. goods").11 In the assumed regime of futures markets (FM), traders can exchange only riskless claims to Z and N. Thus, the purchase of a unit of Z entitles the buyer to receive that unit in each and every state of the world. The model is therefore in real rather than nominal terms (see Grauer and Litzenberger (1979) ). The market regime excludes the possibility of trading claims that are state-contingent, e.g., insurance contracts or equity shares. Spot and futures markets are assumed to be competitive, and individuals are assumed to have homogeneous beliefs.
Traders maximize expected utility by choosing consumption levels of goods N (the numeraire) and Z (the risky good). All individuals have identical preferences over the two goods summarized by the utility function U(n, z). All consumption takes place at date 1.12 We assume that there are S possible states of the world at date 1. Information is publically revealed through a sequence of m information events with binary outcomes, which are jointly conclusive.'3 (I.e., together they determine the state of the world, so that S = 2m.)
The information event j is a random variable 0i whose possible outcomes are denoted ai and bi. 
Effective Completeness of the Futures Markets Regime
Throughout the paper, we will make the mild assumption that the arrival of different information events leads to different prices (otherwise, perturb the endowments to shift prices slightly). This implies the following lemma (all proofs are in the Appendices). The meaning of a shift in a trader's "wealth" occurring at rounds prior to m is developed formally in Appendix 1. In general, if there are enough securities to adjust the level of "wealth" achieved due to different outcomes at each information event, then the market is effectively complete. The futures contract suffices here because of the binomial information structure.14 At each event a futures position shifts wealth across outcomes, so ex ante we can calculate effective prices for transferring wealth from one final state to another. The information structure therefore allows us to exploit the tractable properties of complete markets 14 It is well known that multiple trading rounds can reduce the number of long-lived securities needed to effectively complete a market. See, e.g., Kreps (1982) ; see Duffie and Huang (1985) for a continuous time analysis. Here, absent transaction costs, an efficient allocation is achieved using only the futures contract for the exchange of N for Z. allocations, without eliminating the need for traders to use futures contracts.'5 The binary information structure is the discrete time analog to a diffusion framework with a single state variable, in which two securities complete the market.
HEDGING AND BIAS WITH ZERO TRANSACTION COSTS
We will first examine the pricing of futures contracts in Section 2.1, and then in Section 2.2 derive conclusions about optimal hedging and its relationship to pricing.
Futures Price Bias
In a futures market regime with zero transaction costs, preference complementarity is an important determinant of the direction of futures price bias. Let Ei be the expectation conditional on history si. In the general theory of asset pricing, an asset's (excess) expected return rises with the covariance of its return with each investors' marginal utility of wealth. A "risk premium" is a reward that an asset must offer to compensate for the shortcoming of paying off more in states where wealth adds little to utility. In part (i) of Proposition 1, the covariance of the futures payoff with marginal utility is zero, because of certainty in the aggregate quantity of N. Writing the additively separable preferences as U(n, z) = u(n) + v(z), then with common beliefs individuals trade to a Pareto optimal allocation in which each consumes a nonstochastic amount of N.16 It follows that the marginal utility of possessing one more unit of wealth at time m, which by a standard envelope condition is equal to the marginal utility of consuming one more unit of N, is constant across states.
In part (ii), the reason for downward bias when there is positive complementarity is easily seen when it is noted that, with homothetic preferences, the consumptions of N are nonstochastic."7 Therefore the marginal utility of wealth is highest 15 Unlike options pricing models, here there are no redundant securities. With more than two possible information outcomes at each event, more securities would be required to complete the market. This would introduce portfolio considerations which will not be our focus here.
16 Proof: For any given allocation, replace each individual's consumption of N with its expected value. This is feasible, and by additive separability of preferences, the concavity of u(n), and Jensen's inequality, the new allocation yields a higher level of expected utility.
17Under homotheticity, the ratio of N to Z consumption in each state is the same for all individuals, and so is in proportion to the social totals; with constant aggregate supply of N, this implies that each individual's consumption of N is nonstochastic. when consumption of Z is high, which occurs when the spot price is low. So the futures contract pays off the least (in units of N) when marginal utility is high; this adverse risk characteristic leads to a positive premium for holding the futures contract, i.e., a downward bias."8 For the remainder of the paper, we assume additively separable preferences, so that part (i) of Proposition 1, which predicts martingale pricing, is the relevant case. Unbiasedness is not a general prediction about risk premia; it arises from three stylized features of the current model: separability, effectively complete markets, and nonrandom endowment of the numeraire."9 The martingale case will be useful for two reasons. First, it provides a clear counterexample to the proposition in partial equilibrium models that with risk-averse individuals, the futures price bias is upward or downward according to the sign of producer hedging. Second, it will serve as a baseline from which to highlight the effect of transaction costs on the premium examined in Section 3.
The counterexample shows that martingale pricing is consistent with either long or short hedging. In particular, Section 2.2 shows that, consistent with partial equilibrium models, here hedging by producers tends to be long or short according to the elasticity of demand. This will illustrate how the attempt of hedgers to transfer risk to risk-averse speculators need not produce any bias in the futures price.
Optimal Hedging
The basic intuition is captured by the case of a typical producer in a market with a single conclusive information arrival. Suppose that there are two types of agents, a representative producer/consumer, whose output of Z is positively proportional to the aggregate output of Z, and a pure consumer, whose output of Z is identically zero for all states. If spot demand for Z is unitary elastic, then price and output move in inverse proportion,20 so if the grower does not trade, the numeraire value of his endowment is equal in the two states. Similarly, the value of a pure consumer's endowments is the same across states; if utility as a function of wealth were state independent, there would be no risk to transfer, and we would expect a zero hedge.21 18 Homotheticity in part (ii) of Proposition 1 rules out wealth-induced differences in preferences, to ensure that higher aggregate output of Z leads to higher (lower) marginal utility of N. A stronger version of part (ii) states that the futures price is a downward (upward) biased predictor of all later futures prices, not just the final spot price; this requires the additional assumption of a good-bad information structure, as defined in Section 3.
19Similar martingale results with nonrandom quantity of the numeraire were provided by J. Hirshleifer (1977) in a two-state model, and Richard and Sundaresan (1981) in a continuous time setting. Salant (1976) stressed the sensitivity of this result to the assumption of additive separability. 20 Throughout the paper, we refer to general equilibrium demand elasticity, that is, the percentage rate of change in gross demand for Z as its spot price varies in response to shifts in the Z endowment. 21 Of course, here marginal utility is a function not only of wealth, but also of the random spot price. However, because marginal utilities of endowed wealth are affected by price in a similar way across states for both groups, futures positions with unitary elastic demand will still be null.
With inelastic demand, a typical grower finds that the value of his Z endowment is higher in the low output state, labelled b, than the high output state a, because low output Zb is more than offset by a disproportionately high spot price. So he is motivated to offer futures on sufficiently favorable terms to induce consumers to bear part of his (predominantly price) risk. The sale of a 1: 1 bundle of claims to Z in either state reduces the value of the grower's Z holdings more in state b than in state a, whereas the numeraire payment he receives is of the same value in either state. So selling futures short raises state-a wealth and reduces state-b wealth, which stabilizes the grower's endowed wealth gamble. With elastic demand, revenue is instead higher in state b, so the grower is motivated to go long in futures.
To formalize this argument with many trading rounds, we will assume the property of revenue ordering. This demonstrates a significant inconsistency between the general versus partial equilibrium approaches. The full resolution of this dissonant chord will be deferred until the discussion of bias in Section 3 below. There we will see how setup costs of trading can reinstate the bias/hedging/elasticity relation. To identify more clearly the source of the discrepancy, recall that when demand is inelastic, producers desire to hedge short. The partial equilibrium argument is that outsiders require a downward bias to compensate for the risk of their long futures position; similarly, an upward bias results from elastic demand. This neglects the state-dependence in the indirect utility of wealth function of the traders.
Suppose, instead that besides trading corn futures, outsiders also eat corn. Then the marginal utility of (N-denominated) wealth function depends not only on the trader's wealth, but on the price of corn. Traders optimally arrange their consumptions of N to be level across states. Even though their wealth is not equated across states, they trade to where their marginal utility of wealth (= u'(n)) is. Therefore they are not on the margin willing to pay a premium for a security to shift contingent wealths across states.
A deeper understanding in terms of hedging pressure is provided by considering the consumption levels consumers would achieve if they were able to trade only in the final spot market, not in the prior futures markets. Consumers begin with a nonstochastic endowment of N, so without futures trading, their wealths are independent of state. Since the final spot price at which they can purchase Z is random, they do bear consumption risk. With inelastic demand, a consumer spends more on corn when the price is high than when it is low, so a high price reduces his consumption of N. This implies high marginal utility of the numeraire. Thus, a long position is a good hedge for a consumer, because the futures contract pays off more when his marginal utility of wealth is higher. Similarly, with elastic demand short positions are good hedges for consumers.
It follows that consumers and producers are mutually hedging by taking the opposite sides of the futures transaction. Unlike the pure speculators of partial equilibrium models, consumers are not reluctant acceptors of futures positions. The hedging pressure of producers is met by a comparable hedging pressure of consumers. With additive preferences, these hedging incentives happen to offset precisely, so that neither group pays a premium.
THE MODEL WITH POSITIVE TRANSACTION COSTS
Because people diversify their consumption across commodities, but specialize in production, there are many more consumers than producers in any commodity market. When demand is inelastic, as is typical for agricultural commodities, and with costless trading, growers are predicted here to sell futures to consumers. The disproportion in numbers of the two groups implies that in the equilibrium of Section 2 the long futures position of a typical consumer is small compared with the short position of a typical producer.
Few consumers actually trade futures, in contrast with the predictions of Section 2, as well as those of conventional models of asset pricing. Evidently, some fixed costs limit the participation of outsiders who do not have a stake in production.22 A fixed setup cost drives consumers, who would be small traders, rather than growers differentially from the futures market. This does not mean we apply the original model as if consumers did not exist, for though the actors are late, they arrive in time for the last scene, the spot market. The missing demand in the prior-to-final trading rounds biases the futures market price as compared to the model with costless exchange (as is formalized below).
The constriction of consumer demand for futures contracts (in the inelastic case) or supply of futures (elastic case) introduces downward and upward biases respectively in the futures price as a predictor of the spot price. Instead of a martingale, the benchmark case, there is systematic backwardation or contango according to demand elasticity. The larger the trading costs, the more consumers will be frozen out of the prior rounds, and so the larger the bias. For the inelastic case, this is reminiscent of Hicks' (1939) view that there is a congenital weakness on the demand side in futures markets, leading to "normal backwardation." The proposition that follows assumes that consumers rather than producers are driven by the fixed cost from the futures market. When there are many consumers relative to producers, the positions of consumers under zero transaction costs will be very small compared to producers. A sufficiently small transaction cost will therefore deter only consumers. 23 Two technical assumptions are needed. First is that the spot price for Z, pn is a decreasing function of aggregate output. This could conceivably fail if there were a peculiar pattern of wealth effects. (Such a possibility could be ruled out by the stronger assumption of preferences which lead to aggregation, such as the LOG family or homothetic preferences.) The second assumption is that the arrival of information is unambiguously good or bad news, in the following sense. The intuition for this result is easy to see in the case of a single information event (which automatically has a good-bad information structure). Consider inelastic demand. Producers hedge short, but since transaction costs deter some of their trading partners, they are not as short as they would be if trading were costless. So their wealth is higher in the high price state and lower in the low price state in comparison with a costless trading regime.
With many information arrivals and a fixed cost that is incurred before each futures trade, the number of futures participants after the first round of trading depends on the content of the initial information message, and so is itself a stochastic variable. We simplify here by assuming that there is only a one-shot setup cost t (in numeraire units). An individual incurs a deadweight cost t only
This means that the marginal utility of wealth, instead of being equated across states, is low when the futures payoff is high,24 leading to a positive risk premium. Thus the partial equilibrium result which failed in general equilibrium without transaction costs-to wit, that inelastic demand leads to downward bias and elastic demand to upward bias-is reinstated in a general equilibrium with transaction costs.25 This is despite the fact that qualitatively, the conclusions about hedging drawn in Section 2 are not greatly affected by the addition of transactions costs. Identical producers will still hedge long or short according to demand elasticity, although the amount by which they do so is reduced by an adverse risk premium effect. Consumers, of course, are affected since some will refrain from trading instead of taking small positions on the futures market.
A subtlety brought out by the model about multiple information arrivals is that if the information structure is ambiguous, the price bias might fail to correspond in the expected way with the direction of hedging. Instead of assuming good-bad stochastic dominance, suppose only that the expected output were higher in a' than bJ. Then even though the spot price decreases across final states with aggregate Z, it is possible for the expected spot price (and also, it turns out, the time j futures price) to be higher in a' than in b'. While atypical, this type of case may occur if the event is relatively uninformative about the level of Z, but materially affects variance or higher order moments. 
CONCLUSION
Examining futures pricing in a multigood setting reveals some effects that are not present in partial equilibrium models. Proposition 1 showed that positive complementarity in preferences between consumption goods promotes downward futures price bias, and negative complementarity promotes upward bias. More importantly, contrary to the prediction of single-good partial-equilibrium theory, hedging pressure does not cause futures price bias in a model with costless trading. The paper has provided an example where the optimal futures hedging positions of identical growers are determined by demand price elasticity (Proposition 2). With additively separable preferences, futures prices are unbiased predictors of later spot prices regardless of demand elasticity (Proposition 1), even though hedging is long or short for elastic and inelastic demand respectively. With nonadditive preferences as well, there is no tendency for the bias to match the direction of producer hedging.
The divergence of these results from those of standard hedging pressure theory is due to allowing for hedging incentives of consumers, which are opposite to the hedging incentives of producers. However, the standard partial-equilibrium models are certainly realistic in (implicitly) assuming nonparticipation by consumers. This feature can be incorporated in a general equilibrium framework by adding a fixed setup cost of trading. Fixed costs of trading futures differentially drive the smaller traders (consumers) rather than the larger traders (producers) from the futures market. Allowing for trading costs reinstates the prediction of downward bias (backwardation) under inelastic demand, when producers hedge short; correspondingly, the model predicts upward bias (contango) for elastic demand, when producer hedging is long (Proposition 3). This effect, being systematic, is in contrast with the implications of imperfect-arbitrage models in which trading costs merely add a band of inaccuracy around the perfect markets baseline prediction.
This effect also contrasts with pricing relations derived from models with costless trading, which frequently can be obtained by assuming identical individuals, so that securities are priced to deter trading. Here, the predictions for bias arise from differential exclusion of some potential traders from the futures market, nonparticipation being a function of the endowments of the trader. The model therefore reflects in an essential way a feature of commodity futures markets which traditional theorists have considered important for pricing and the success of contracts: that the market brings about an interaction between distinct classes of traders, producers ("hedgers") and outsiders ("speculators").
In other contexts also, risks that are concentrated among a few traders should be more influential for pricing than dispersed risks. We would expect, for example, that the pricing of bonds and interest rate futures contracts would reflect more the hedging incentives of owners or managers of financial institutions than those of small homeowners.
The central theme of this paper may be summarized as follows. Partial-equilibrium models of commodity futures pricing are logically incomplete, since they neglect the consumption choice amongst different goods whose prices vary. However, they are realistic in an important respect-implicitly allowing for transaction costs. To combine logical completeness with realism, predictions should be derived from general equilibrium models that explicitly include the costs that limit market participation. This will sometimes, though not necessarily always, justify the predictions of partial-equilibrium models. This is a linear budget constraint on wealth shifts chosen at j -1, so since pj(a) 0 pi(b), the states are spanned by dynamic trading strategies initiated at j-1. Therefore, by induction, the market is effectively complete at all dates.
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SEMI-CONTINGENT MARKETS
It is convenient for later proofs to introduce an artifical trading regime, semi-contingent markets (SCM), to describe the equilibrium in the assumed FM regime. The efficient allocation achieved under FM could be characterized by examining the trading problem of a one-shot complete market for contingent claims on the two goods. However, with additive separability or with homotheticity, since endowments and consumption of N are nonrandom, contingent trading in N is a degree of freedom for which traders have no use. It is therefore convenient to price contingent claims to Z in terms of uncontingent claims to numeraire N. In SCM, which is also effectively complete, there is a single round of trading, and contingent claims to Z are tradable. However, when a trader buys or sells units of N, the same quantity must be delivered in each state of the world.
We consider the decision of a trader on a semi-contingent market opened by surprise immediately following event 9', so let n I and zs ( 2. Ordering of Contingent Wealths and Spot Prices over States: To achieve similar ordering of consumption in an FM regime, contingent wealth in the final trading rounds must, for all individuals, be ordered similarly across states. If demand is inelastic/elastic, then a trader's expenditure on Z, P"'z"' is similarly/inversely ordered with P"n. Recalling that by effective completeness consumption n is constant across states, it follows that to pay for this the wealth for each trader must be similarly/inversely ordered with spot price as demand is inelastic/elastic. Since the futures price at time j is equal to the expected value of the spot price, 
